Kayani, a man for many seasons

PKKH

Shuja Nawaz

In a timely though perhaps overly dramatic move, Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani of Pakistan announced recently on national television the extension of army chief General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani for another three years beyond November this year, when his first term was to end. Timely, since any further delay in announcing it would have led to further speculation and confusion about what was to happen. Dramatic, since the normal manner would have been a press release from the Inter Services Relations Directorate.

But then this is Pakistan and anything to do with the army chief makes headlines. And this announcement further strengthens the view that the army continues to be a key player even as democracy struggles to establish itself in a country that has been ruled for more than half its life by the military.

This is the first time a civilian government has extended an army chief for a full term. In the past, extensions have been either short, given by military rulers to themselves or, in the case of the first military ruler, Ayub Khan, to an ineffectual army chief with no independent power base. Benazir Bhutto sought to break with tradition when she offered an extension to General Abdul Waheed in 1996 but he refused it. Kayani took pains to convey the impression that he would not seek an extension nor negotiate for one. It appears that the government made him an offer he could not refuse.

Kayani is widely regarded as a quiet, professional soldier, who has helped transform the army in his tenure from a largely conventional force to one that is effectively fighting an irregular war inside its own borders. His new tenure gives him a rare opportunity to continue the transformation of the Pakistan into army into a professional body ready to fight insurgencies and conventional enemies equally well. He maintains a low public profile and is seen as a thinking general. Compared with his predecessor, General Pervez Musharraf, who was tempestuous and rarely had time to read, Kayani is deliberate. From the outset, he stated a policy of keeping the army out of politics, a policy that he tried to maintain even while selectively intervening in political squabbles as a referee. In recent months he has played a key role in moving the United States-Pakistan strategic dialogue onto a higher plane in terms of content and action.

While many inside and outside the country have welcomed the move as providing continuity and stability at a time of a raging insurgency and the rise of militancy inside Pakistan, others view it as a retrogressive move away from institutionalizing the selection and promotion system by linking it to personalities. Above all, it is a political move since the final decision was made by a politician. The United States has studiously avoided taking a public position but conversations with U.S. diplomats and military officials over the past few months indicated their deep interest in the future of General Kayani and a noticeable desire to see him remain at the helm of affairs in Pakistan. Yet Kayani on his part has showed no signs that he is or even is willing to be painted as “America’s choice.”

What are the implications of this extension? In the near term, it opens up the possibility of a routine promotion for the next senior most army general to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee when that position falls vacant in October 2010. There may well be an opportunity also to elevate one of the other service chiefs, from the air force or navy, to bolster inter-service cohesion. Within the army there has been some talk of a Vice Chief. This may make sense for such a large army but runs against the grain, since the Pakistan army has a steep pyramid structure. Authority rests in one man: the chief. When I suggested to my own brother, General Asif Nawaz, when he took over as Army chief in 1991 that he appoint a deputy chief to help manage the administrative details of his work, his reply was crisp: “Command is indivisible!” While not supported by historical evidence, this mantra has taken hold in Pakistan and was echoed by General Pervez Musharraf for different and perhaps political reasons, even though he appointed a Vice Chief of the Army Staff. But Musharraf made all the important decisions himself.

In the longer run, the career paths of many senior generals will be affected by this decision. Nearly a dozen operational three-stars (Lieutenant Generals) will retire before Kayani’s new term expires in November 2013. These include a number of very bright and highly trained officers whom he has promoted to three star rank in April this year. As a result, the age and service gap between Kayani and his corps commanders in another two years will be quite large, as he digs down into the ranks order to promote new commanders. The nature and quality of the exchanges between him and his commanders will necessarily be affected, as was the case for General Zia ul-Haq and General Musharraf before him. Few junior officers will be willing to challenge the views of such a senior chief. Yet, he has exhibited a certain collegiality in his exchanges with fellow officers. If he can maintain that approach it will serve him in good stead. Politically, the country will of necessity see another election during Kayani’s extended term, unless things deteriorate so dramatically internally or in relations with Pakistan’s fractious neighbors that the army, under public pressure, mounts another coup. Here, Kayani will fight against historical precedent: in the past, an extension or the dismissal of a chief and replacement by a new chief invariably led to a coup, as mutual suspicions between the civilians and the military was compounded.

A positive spin-off from the extension in the eyes of some may be that a slew of Musharraf promotees will also retire between now and 2013 reducing the tension between them and others vying for the next rung. Some of these are strong professional officers but the taint of having been favored by Musharraf may remain. After all, Kayani too was a Musharraf choice. A major advantage that might accrue is that the certainty provided by the new term for the army chief will allow the civilian government to become confident in asserting itself in policy matters, knowing that the army chief will not overtly intervene in its affairs. This may help strengthen political institutions. At the same time, civilians must resist the temptation to turn to the army to lead the battle against militancy (a national endeavor not purely a military one) or to arbitrate differences on the political field.

These three years should also give Kayani time to assess the present Higher Defense Organization of Pakistan and perhaps come up with a more devolved structure for the army and a better system of command and control at the center. One possible scenario may include regional and centralized commands at four-star rank, appointed by the same authority who selects the service chiefs, and a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs with real powers to regulate all the services while acting as the main military advisor of the government. This approach has been taken by the United States and many other modern militaries, so it would hardly be unprecedented. Without having a stake in the chairman’s position in 2013, Kayani may be able to provide a dispassionate plan for the government to decide, well in advance of the next round of promotions in 2013. Any proposal that he presents as a disinterested party will have credibility and will also help override the parochial concerns of the army relative to the other services in Pakistan.

All this will be against the backdrop of Pakistan’s traditional rivalry with emerging superpower India to the east. Kayani would be key to any effort to reduce hostility and to open the eastern border to trade and traffic. He has already played a role in opening up to Afghanistan and perhaps positioning Pakistan to play a role in the reconciliation efforts of Afghan President Hamid Karzai.

The United States, as a key ally, must also understand that the army chief in Pakistan will think foremost about Pakistan’s interests. To the extent that they have an interlocutor who knows them well, from his extensive U.S. training and contacts, the U.S. will benefit from a clear dialogue. Removing years of mistrust will take a major and longer-term effort. Officer exchanges will help. But most important will be steady provision of the best possible equipment to the Pakistani forces in their battle against insurgents and militants, with no underlying threats or overhanging waivers accompanying those transfers. That is what trust means.

Key to this entire enterprise is the man who will continue to head the Pakistan army beyond President Barack Obama’s first term and into the term of the next elected government in Pakistan: General Kayani, truly now a man for many seasons.

Shuja Nawaz is Director of the South Asia Center of the Atlantic Council.

Indian Government Pulled Own Foreign Minister’s Leg

NEW DELHI, India—This is not the first time that Indian extremists have sabotaged crucial peace talks with Pakistan.

On 19 February 2007, one day before Pakistan Foreign Minister Khurshid Kasuri landed in New Delhi for peace talks, a bomb exploded aboard Samjota Express, or the friendship train launched as a peace gesture. Fifty nine Pakistani visitors to India were burned alive. Cynically, the Indian government accused ISI and Kashmiri freedom fighters but it turned out later that serving Indian Military Intelligence Officers and members of a Hindu terror group were involved. The Indian officers were arrested for a trial but a gradual blackout was slapped on the investigations.

It was the clearest evidence to date proving the existence of a pro-war camp in New Delhi that springs into action whenever anyone in the Indian government decides to discuss Kashmir with Pakistan.

It is almost if there is an undeclared gag on Indian politicians warning them of consequences if they dare try to resolve disputes with Pakistan.

Unfortunately, the American and British media and politicians continue to turn a blind eye to the existence of extremists in New Delhi.

The same Indian pro-war camp sprung into action on 15 July 2010. And its latest victim was Indian’s own foreign minister S. M. Krishna.

Mr. Krishna realizes the bitter truth: His government, or influential elements within it, pulled his leg as he landed in Islamabad for crucial peace talks with Pakistan.

A bitter Mr. Krishna accused his own government’s interior secretary G. K. Pillai of sabotaging Krishna’s visit to Pakistan.

Pillai “would have been wiser” if he had not made his damaging statement, said Krishna in a television interview with CNN-IBN on Wednesday.

Mr. Pillai, of course, acted on behalf of all the extremists in New Delhi in scuttling the talks.

This political tussle in New Delhi was as intense as the melodramatic Indian movies.

As Mr. Krishna’s plane touches down in Islamabad on 15 July, 2010, Mr. Pillai in New Delhi issued a statement claiming Pakistani government and ISI were directly involved in Mumbai attacks.

This statement ties Mr. Krishna’s hands and poisons the expected talks before they even begin.

Could anything be more dramatic than this?

Krishna told CNN-IBN’s Editor-in-Chief Rajdeep Sardesi that the Indian home secretary was almost responsible for destroying the talks with Pakistan.

“Well, in hindsight, I think Pillai could have waited till I came back to issue a statement. Perhaps it would have been wiser if that statement had not been made just on the eve of my visit,” said Krishna.

But the real question that Mr. Krishna avoided discussing in public, possibly because it is damaging to India, is this: Who within the Indian government planned to sabotage talks with Pakistan?

Someone brave in the Indian media will have to step up and expose the pro-war camp within the Indian government, military, intelligence and Hindu extremist and terror groups. This pro-war Indian camp is violently opposed to peace in Pakistan and Kashmir.

Pakistani government officials, the military, and the Pakistani civil society have to step up and draw the world’s attention to the terrorists in New Delhi who burned 59 Pakistanis alive one day before Pakistani foreign minister landed in New Delhi on 19 Feb.

It is not Mumbai attacks of 2008 but the Samjota Express attack of 2007 that hold the key to exposing who is stalling efforts to resolve Kashmir and other disputes between Pakistan and India.

The ‘Najibullah Exit Strategy’ from Afghanistan

The Soviets left Afghanistan in the hands of one Najibullah. The US wants to leave Afghanistan in the hands of Hamid Karzai.

There are grim parallels between the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 and the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2011, however there are many differences. The Soviet withdrawal was orderly and quick. The Afghan National Resistance (then the Mujahideen) had given safe passage to the Soviets.

Pakistan has tried to broker a deal between President Hamid Karzai and the new The Afghan National Resistance (aka Taliban). However the ingrate US media and the US administrations loose lips are sinking ships. The Afghan National Resistance is tasting victory and do not want to make any concessions to the puppet administration in Kabul. Mr. Karzai has put all his eggs in the Pakistani basket, and is busy talking to the Afghan National Resistance in some sort of a power-sharing agreement. The Pakistanis are facilitating this process. The most likely scenario is that the Afghan National Resistance which already has control over 90% of the Afghan territory will be recognized as the de jure ruler of many if not all of the provinces of Afghanistan. Local control is already in the hands the Afghan National Resistance. Kabul and ISAF acts as if it rules Afghanistan–in actual fact the Afghan National Resistance rules Afghanistan.

There is a huge fallacy in Western thinking–of course seeded by Delhi, that Afghanistan will return to the 1992-1996 situation after the US leaves Afghanistan. Giving up on ruling all of Afghanistan, Delhi is now proposing that it be given sway over the Non-Pakhtun lands–in a so called de facto partition of Afghanistan. The Ex-US Ambassador to Dalhi Mr. Robert Blackwill now acts on behalf of India Inc in Washington. He is attempting to sell the “partition along ethnic lines” swamp to the Americans. He has a tough sell.

The 1992-1996 Afghan Civil war had many ingredients which are similar to 2011, however there are many factors which have brought about a paradigm shift in the situation on the ground.

Firstly neither Russia nor Iran is interested in prolonging the war in Afghanistan. Teheran in fact is no longer the Bharati (aka Indian) ally its used to be in 2002. Dlehi’s backstabbing Tehran at the IAEA, the Indian support for Anti-Iranian terrorists like Rigi brothers, the arming of Jundullah by Bharat, the Indian launch of Iran-specific satellites for Israel, and general downturn of Delhi-Tehran relations makes it impossible for Iran to support Bharat’s expansionist hegemonic designs in Afghanistan. Additionally Iran has supported the Pan-Afghan solution, and agreed to talking to the Afghan National Resistance (aka Taliban) in the Tehran Conference on Afghanistan (Iran-Afghanistan-Pakistan), at the Istanbul Conference on Afghanistan (All neighbor of Afghanistan and Turkey, at the London Conference on Afghanistan (62 countries of the world including the US, the UK, China and Russia), and at the Kabul Conference on Afghanistan (72 countries of the world including all major powers).

The American withdrawal from Afghanistan is supposedly going to take three years. However, we predict that once the withdrawal starts, there will be an uncontrollable momentum which will be impossible to slow down or stop. Once the first fifty thousand or so solders leave, the assaults on Kabul will leave any further presence untenable.

• President Barack Obama’s announcement that the United States will begin pulling its troops out Afghanistan in 2011 provides a good opportunity to look back and study history.
• This will, after all, be the second time Afghans have bid farewell to a superpower
• When the Soviets pulled out in 1989… the man the Soviets left in charge was Mohammad Najibullah, who clung to power for three more years, then sheltered for another four years in the U.N. compound in Kabul, before finally ending up strung up by the Taliban from a Kabul traffic lamp in 1996
• Najibullah’s grisly end means his career hardly seems like one that President Hamid Karzai would want to emulate
• Najibullah actually held on to power far longer than most in the West expected. His government in fact actually outlasted the Soviet Union itself, which collapsed in 1991.
• The Afghan Civil war ensued 1992-96–with Bharat sponsoring some of the worst violence emanating from the Northern Alliance.
• Taliban’s rose to power in 1996
• Perhaps Karzai — and Obama — could do a lot worse than to study Najibullah’s career, to see how to keep Afghanistan together when the superpower exits.

Nikolas Gvosdev, a former Soviet diplomat has written several articles on Afghanistan. He is vitriolic against Pakistan and probably blames Islamabad for the destruction of the USSR. Gvosdev’s timeline thorugh chronologically accurate does not give the full picture.

The 2014 Afghan security plan unveiled by President Hamid Karzai this week at the international conference in Kabul raises once again the question of whether the U.S. and NATO are moving towards a 21st century variant of the “Najibullah strategy” as they seek to determine their end game in Afghanistan.

The reference is to the regime of Mohamed Najibullah, the Afghan leader at the time the Soviet Union withdrew its combat forces from Afghanistan in 1989. The Afghan government that the Soviets left behind controlled the major population centers as well as some of the rural regions of the country, primarily in the non-Pashtun north and west, and had a tenuous hold over the major lines of communication. The Najibullah regime had inherited a generous amount of military equipment, including aircraft and even SCUD missiles. The government in Kabul was also heavily subsidized by Moscow, subsidies that helped it secure the support of local powerbrokers and purchase the allegiance of insurgent commanders.

Soviet training had produced an Afghan army that, contrary to all predictions and expectations, was able to halt and throw back a major mujihadeen assault that had been expected to quickly take Kabul and drive out the Soviet-backed government. That victory at Jalalabad boosted morale for government forces, leading them to reassess Najibullah’s prospects for survival.

We have some of these same preconditions in place today, especially in terms of the balance of forces in Afghanistan and the territory that is under the effective control of the Kabul government. But for those preconditions to solidify, Western strategic planners must not forget, as Derek Reveron put it, that this is “the Afghans’ war and not the Afghan War”. The emphasis of the now-deploying troop surge should not be for U.S. and NATO forces to win territory for the Kabul government, but rather to stabilize the current lines of control and concentrate on the training and equipping of the Afghan security forces, with an eye to implementing Karzai’s 2014 security plan. Keep in mind that the Soviets installed Najibullah in 1987 and thereafter began building up his capabilities with an eye towards the eventual 1989 pullout.

As with the Najibullah government, the Karzai administration will need a major military victory won not by Western forces, but by the Afghan army, if it is to gain the allegiance of “fence-sitting” locals currently hedging their bets between Kabul and the Taliban insurgency in many parts of Afghanistan.

The good news is that one of the major reasons for the ultimate downfall of the Najibullah government in 1992 — the continued and unrelenting opposition of the Pakistani government — might be much less of a factor today. Karzai is pursuing a strategic partnership with Islamabad that is changing the tone and dynamic of the relationship. Should the recently initialed draft of a proposed “transit deal” — which would guarantee that Afghan exports reach Indian markets through Pakistan — be implemented in practice, it would further reinforce trust between the two capitals.

At the same time, judging from the recent shakeup in the Afghan cabinet, Karzai is looking to reduce Kabul’s traditional “tilt” toward India in favor of a more balanced approach that would concede to Pakistan a greater degree of influence in the southern part of the country. The U.S. is also appearing to sweeten the pot by announcing a new set of aid measures for Pakistan, leverage the Soviet Union didn’t have 20 years ago.

There are, of course, a number of downsides as well. Najibullah’s early successes were achieved, in part, by outright dealmaking with local warlords who subsequently betrayed him when they got better offers from the mujahideen. Attempting to replicate the Najibullah strategy today would mean, in essence, cutting deals with Afghanistan’s current crop of powerbrokers, undermining reform efforts designed to encourage good governance. Whether the U.S. wants to arm Afghans with the type of destructive weaponry the Soviets gave to Najibullah — and countenance a very heavy handed use of that equipment — also remains to be seen, as does Washington’s willingness to underwrite the expenses of the Afghan government.

Despite the promises of U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton that any political settlement cannot come at the cost of Afghan women’s rights, a “Najibullah strategy” would effectively end such reform efforts, at least in broad sections of the Pashtun areas of Afghanistan — for the same reason that Najibullah also dumped many of the communist social engineering efforts in Afghanistan initiated by his predecessor, Babrak Karmal.

Finally, Karzai might succeed at securing Pakistani support by essentially conceding large sections of the south and east to Pakistan-backed Taliban elements in return for retaining a more limited central government. But that will leave him in a weaker position when it comes to balancing the strategic interests of Iran, India, Russia and the Central Asian states. In such a case, perhaps having a more clear delineation of spheres of influence in Afghanistan might be useful, so that major powers move away from seeing the country in zero-sum terms.

There are, however, no guarantees. Najibullah ended up falling from power — and was ultimately executed by the Taliban. In Chechnya, where the Russians used a variant of this strategy to withdraw federal forces from the war-torn republic, the regime of President Ramzan Kadyrov maintains order, but at a high financial cost for the Kremlin and with unrest by no means contained. Indeed, it is now spilling out into other parts of the North Caucasus.

But if the Obama administration, like Mikhail Gorbachev, has its eye on a definitive date for withdrawing U.S. forces from Afghanistan, then we are likely to see further moves along this path.

Nikolas K. Gvosdev is the former editor of the National Interest, and a frequent foreign policy commentator in both the print and broadcast media. He is currently on the faculty of the U.S. Naval War College. The views expressed are his own and do not reflect those of the Navy or the U.S. government. His weekly WPR column, The Realist Prism, appears every Friday.

Photo: Soviet troops withdrawing from Afghanistan, 1988 (Photo by Mikhail Evstafiev, licensed under the Creative Commons ShareAlike 2.5 Generic Agreement). The Realist Prism: The Najibullah Exit Strategy in Afghanistan. Nikolas Gvosdev | Bio | 23 Jul 2010, World Politics Review

Bharat is upset at President Hamid Karzai, and has been supporting his rival Mr. Abdullah Abdullah. Will Bharat upset the American plans by assassinating Mr. Hamid Karzai and hoping for a more complaint Afghan rule?

Bharat is working to partition Afghanistan, so that it can create “Pakktunistan” within Afghanistan. It wants to egg on the Abdullah Abdullah clan in forming their own Non-Pakhtun region independent from Kabul. It wants to get the support of Iran to do this. That help is not available this time around. Bharat wants to use the Afghan “Pakhtunistan” to put pressure on the Pakistani Pakhtuns and use the progeny of the Frontier Gandhi to put pressure on Pakistan and to destabilize it from the Western front. Fully realizing the that Nuclear bombs seal Pakistan’s Eastern flank, it wants to continue to use terror as a means to pursue its irredentist and revanchist dreams.

U.S. upgrades diplomatic ties with Palestine

The U.S. announced this week that it would upgrade its diplomatic relations with the Palestinian Authority by granting its mission in Washington – which is actually a PLO mission – the same status it enjoys in most European countries: that of a PLO “general delegation.”

This is still a lower status than an embassy and does not give them any diplomatic privileges or immunities – a status the PA mission does have in many African and Asian countries, as well as some European and South American states. But it is a major step above what the PA has had until now.

Prior to this decision, the PA mission in Washington was at a very low level from the point of view of protocol: It was not even allowed to fly the PLO flag at the entrance to its offices.
Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and U.S. President Barack Obama
Photo by: Archive

“This decision reflects our confidence that through direct negotiations, we can help achieve a two-state solution with an independent and viable Palestine living side by side with Israel,” said White House spokesman Thomas Vietor. “We should begin preparing for that outcome now, as we continue to work with the Palestinian people on behalf of a better future.”

The PA has been seeking an upgrade in diplomatic relations ever since U.S. President Barack Obama took office last year. But after 18 months without progress, it received a letter from the State Department on Tuesday announcing that the U.S. had agreed. The letter was sent to Maen Areikat, who heads the PLO mission in Washington.

The Americans began seriously considering the upgrade two weeks ago as one of several steps it intends to take in an effort to entice Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas into direct talks with Israel. A week ago, American officials contacted both the Israeli embassy in Washington and the Prime Minister’s Office in Jerusalem to see whether Israel would object to the upgrade, a senior Israeli official said. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu responded that he had no objections.

A senior Palestinian official confirmed the upgrade, and stressed that this is more than a symbolic step. “This move will enable PLO officials and Palestinian diplomats to operate in Washington in an official and orderly manner,” he said.

The U.S. has also promised that if the PA does agree to direct talks, the construction freeze in the settlements will continue, and “not one house will be built,” Abbas said this week.

Abbas made this claim three days ago, in an address to his Fatah movement’s Revolutionary Council. But since the media were barred from that meeting, it became known only Thursday, when the PA published it on its official website, Wafa.

In his speech to the council, Abbas said he has not yet received sufficiently clear answers from the Americans about other issues that he wants settled before the talks begin, and is therefore not yet willing to agree to them. While Obama sent him a message that contained very positive statements on the subject of borders, he said, they were “not positive enough.”

Abbas said he would submit a definite response to Washington’s request for direct Israeli-Palestinian talks on July 28, but his basic position is that direct talks will be possible only if sufficient progress is first made on the issues of borders and security during the indirect talks now being conducted with American mediation.

PA officials said this week that the PA has asked Israel for answers on several specific points relating to these issues, and will not agree to direct talks unless the replies are satisfactory. But so far, they said, Israel has not responded.

The PA’s insistence on a complete settlement freeze stems from the fear that its image will suffer severely if it agrees to direct talks without one. It also fears that Israel is not really serious about the talks, and would therefore rather wait until September, when the 10-month freeze on settlement construction expires, to see whether Israel extends it.

If so, the PA might view that as a sign of good faith on Netanyahu’s part. White House spokesman Thomas Vietor said, “This decision reflects our confidence that through direct negotiations, we can help achieve a two-state solution with an independent and viable Palestine living side by side with Israel. We should begin preparing for that outcome now, as we continue to work with the Palestinian people on behalf of a better future.”

Israel’s defense establishment, meanwhile, has advised the government to allow the Palestinian Authority to import 50 Russian-made armored vehicles – something Israel has been refusing to do for five years now.

Russia first proposed giving the vehicles, which are armored only against light weapons, to the PA security services more than five years ago, in an effort to strengthen the rule of PA President Mahmoud Abbas. In March 2008, toward the end of Ehud Olmert’s term as prime minister, Israel finally informed the Russians that it would approve the deal – but only if the number was halved to 25 and the vehicles were altered so that it would be impossible to mount a machine gun on them.

The PA agreed to these restrictions, saying it needed the vehicles to maintain law and order and deter Hamas. But in practice, the deal never went through, because Jerusalem got cold feet after the decision provoked a storm of criticism from the right wing, which accused it of repeating the mistakes of the Oslo era – when weapons Israel gave the PA were later turned on Israeli soldiers and civilians.

In the meantime, the Russians sent 50 of the vehicles to Jordan, where PA security personnel were trained in their use as part of a wider American-led training program aimed at upgrading the PA’s security capabilities. Recently, the PA again began asking that the vehicles be allowed in, raising the issue with both Israel and the United States.

Both the Israel Defense Forces’ Central Command and the coordinator of government activities in the territories have recommended that the government accede to this request, in light of the impressive improvement in security cooperation between Israel and the PA. A security official told Haaretz that as long as the vehicles cannot mount machine guns, they pose no danger to Israeli forces.

But it seems likely that Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak will seek to link this gesture to the effort to persuade the PA to move from indirect to direct diplomatic negotiations.Haaretz

Pro-Pakistani demonstrators protest, defying curfew in Srinagar

SRINAGAR (Indian Occupied Kashmir): In occupied Kashmir, the authorities clamped curfew in Srinagar, Sopore, Kupwara, Handwara and Bandipore while imposing strict restrictions in Baramulla, Pulwama, Islamabad, Kulgam, Budgam and other towns on Friday to thwart anti-India demonstrations, reports KMS.

Life continued to remain disrupted in the Valley with shops, business establishments, educational institutions and banks remaining closed and traffic off the road.

Despite restrictions, people staged protests in Srinagar, Budgam, Pampore, Shopian, Pulwama, Sumbal, Safapora, Hajan and Langate areas. Indian police subjected the demonstrators to heavy baton charge and excessive teargas shelling, injuring several of them.

The occupation authorities continued to place the APHC Chairman, Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, Agha Syed Hassan Al-Moosvi and Yasmeen Raja under house arrest. They were not even allowed to offer Juma prayers. Due to curfew, Juma congregational prayers could not be held at Jamia Masjid in Srinagar for the fourth successive Friday, today.

On the other hand, the APHC Chairman in a statement issued in Srinagar appealed to the Organisation of Islamic Conference to take serious note of the death and destruction being caused by Indian troops in the occupied territory.

Illegally detained veteran Kashmiri Hurriyet leader Syed Ali Gilani was admitted to the Intensive Care Unit in Soura Institute of Medical Sciences after his condition deteriorated at Cheshmashahi sub-jail.

The Chairman of Jammu and Kashmir Peoples Movement, Ghulam Ahmed Mir addressing party workers in Jammu deplored that India was using brutal tactics against the innocent people of Kashmir to suppress their struggle for right to self-determination.

Another report says; at least twenty-two people were injured when Indian police subjected demonstrators to brute force at different places. Despite restrictions and rains, people took to streets in Srinagar, Shopian and Baramulla and staged anti-India demonstrations.

Police resorted to heavy teargas shelling and aerial firing to quell the demonstrators in which about two-dozen people were injured. The police also arrested nearly half-a-dozen youth from Shopian.

The residents of the Valley have been complaining of acute shortage of essentials including milk, medicines and edibles due to the continued restrictions imposed by the occupation authorities. “Shopkeepers have already exhausted their stocks,” Mehmood Ahmad, a resident of Srinagar, told mediamen.

US cancels plan to attack Qandahar

As expected General Petraeus has canceled the plans to attack Qandahar. The attack doesn’t make any sense while Mr. Hamid Karzai is trying to build relationships with the Afghan National Resistence (aka Taliban).

He has decided a full-scale military encirclement and invasion – as American troops had done in Iraq’s Fallujah – was not an appropriate model to tackle the Taliban in the southern capital.

Gen Petraeus’s decision to revise the entire strategy comes just weeks after he arrived in Afghanistan following the abrupt dismissal of Gen Stanley McChrystal for insubordination.

Gen McChrystal had planned a summer conquest of the Taliban in Kandahar to reinvigorate the battle against the Taliban.

But the operation has been repeatedly delayed by concerns that it would not adequately restore the confidence of city residents in the security forces.

Gen Petraeus is reported to believe that the operation must be a broad-ranging counter-insurgency campaign, involving more troops working with local militias.

The plan he inherited was criticised for placing too much emphasis on targeted assassinations of key insurgent leaders and not enough on winning over local residents.

Richard Holbrooke, the US special envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan, said yesterday that the US-led strategy in southern Afghanistan was undergoing sweeping changes.

“Kandahar is not a military operation like Fallujah,” Mr Holbrooke said. “We have Gen David Petraeus looking at the plan, scrubbing it down, looking at it again.”

President Hamid Karzai has bolstered Gen Petraeus’s efforts by agreeing to a US proposal to pay defectors from the Taliban to form local defence militias.

Mr Holbrooke, who oversees the civilian component of the American campaign in Afghanistan, has been described by Gen Petraeus as his “wing man” in the effort to reverse Taliban gains.

He said that the changes of strategy in the area also included a decision not to destroy poppy crops this year, an action that had in the past “driven” farmers into alliance with the Taliban.

He also said that the Afghan police force in Marjah – which now numbers 60 – could not yet replace thousands of US Marines. Efforts to stabilise Helmand’s Marjah have been bogged down by stronger resistance.

Gen Petraeus recruited prominent military experts who assisted him in the surge of forces that brought stability to Iraq.

Stephen Biddle, a military strategist at the US Council for Foreign Relations, coauthored as suggestion that the US would be successful in Afghanistan if it could set up a strong local government in places like Kandahar.

Defections from the Taliban are crucial to the goal of ending the war within four years but Mr Holbrooke said only insurgent groups that had split with al-Qaeda, and willing to work within the framework of the Afghan constitution would be approached.

More effort was being put into recruiting local allies on a district by district basis.

“The reintegration policy is the key to a successful counter-insurgency campaign,” he said. “As for reconciliation, it’s out there somewhere. We’ve talked about it. The US will support Afghan-led reconciliation and by that we mean we need to know what’s going on. Not much is going on now, and nothing is going on with the United States.”

Mr Holbrooke said Pakistan had dramatically increased its co-operation with the US in the battle against the Taliban but he criticised Islamabad’s continuing support for the Haqqani network of insurgents.

“Without Pakistan’s participation, this (Afghan) war could go on indefinitely,” he said. “There’s much more co-operation at every level

“But I don’t want to mislead you, it is not yet where we hope it will be. What we talk about is the Haqqani network. Let’s be very specific. It’s a real problem.” Guardian by Damien McElroy, Foreign Affairs Correspondent Published: 9:00PM BST 23 Jul 2010